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ABSTRACT
Using the firm-level data set, the paper attempts to examine the dynamic patterns in the allocation
of credit across firms in recent Korea. In particular, the paper examines the dynamic patterns in the
allocation of credit across large and small firms before and after the crisis. The data suggest that large
firms, to some extent, are leaving banks and going to the capital market for their financing after the
crisis. The data also suggest that profitable small firms are gaining easier access to the credit from
financial institutions after the crisis. Is this shift (in the allocation of bank credit from large firms to
small firms) due to lenders’ choice or due to borrowers’ changed incentives? The paper suggests that
the improved lending practices of banks, at least partially, contributed to this shift of bank credit from
large firms to small firms.
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1. Introduction 
Using the firm-level data set
1, this paper attempts to examine the dynamic patterns in the 
allocation of credit across firms in recent Korea.  Supposedly, in Korea, the economic crisis in 
1997 had a significant impact on the pattern in the allocation of credit across firms.  In particular, 
this paper aims to examine the dynamic patterns in the allocation of credit across large and small 
firms after the crisis. 
Corporate financing issues are intimately related to the cause of the Korean crisis.  For 
instance, the chaebols’ indebtedness to banks is viewed as having contributed much to the crisis.  
Among others, Krueger and Yoo (2001) demonstrate that the chaebols’ indebtedness is indeed the 
chief culprit of the crisis.  Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997, the government has 
undertaken various reform measures to restructure the financial and corporate sectors.  The new 
regulatory system is now underway to induce the financial institutions to change their imprudent 
lending practices, and the capital market began to force the chaebols to correct their incentive 




financial institutions to change their previously imprudent (borrowing and lending) practices. 
The paper suggests that large firms, to some extent, are leaving banks and going to the capital 
market for their financing after the crisis.  The paper also suggests that profitable small firms are 
gaining easier access to credit by financial institutions after the crisis.  There has been a shift in 
the allocation of bank credit from large firms to small firms.   Is this shift due to lenders’ choice or 
due to borrowers’ changed incentives?  The paper suggests that the improved lending practices of 
banks, at least partially, contributed to this shift of bank credit from large firms to small firms. 
This paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we provide the aggregate data on the 
corporate financing sources in recent Korea.  Section 3 explains the firm-level data set.  In 
Section 4, we examine the dynamic patterns in the allocation of credit across firms.  Section 5 
concludes the paper with agenda for future research. 
2. Aggregate Patterns in the Corporate Financing Sources 
In <table 1> we show the aggregate data for the sources of corporate financing before and after 
the economic crisis.  We calculated the numbers in <table 1> from the information given in 
various issues of the Flows of Funds by the Bank of Korea. 
//Table 1 here// 
The main reason we present this table is that it decomposes indirect finance further into the 
detailed sources (commercial banks, insurance companies (including pension funds), short-term 
finance companies (e.g., merchant banks), and other non-bank financial intermediaries).  Another 
point in the table is that it has been constructed by aggregating all the financial transactions for all 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




the firms in the Korean economy.  Hence, we could use this table for the check of the consistency 
in the firm-level data, for example, whether there is any systematic bias in the firm-level data due 
to the exclusion of extra-small firms. 
After the crisis, in 1998-9, the share of external finance in the total finance sharply declines to 
50% from about 70% throughout the 90’s until 1997
2.   
In 1998, as expected, the crisis changes completely the table for corporate financing sources.  
However, in 2000 when the crisis phases out, the table for corporate financing sources takes a 
somewhat different composition compared to before the crisis.     
First of all, the share of indirect finance does not recover the level before the crisis.    A look 
into the components of indirect finance is necessary.  The non-bank financial intermediaries, 
except for insurance companies, lose their share significantly compared with before the crisis.  
On the other hand, the share of commercial banks increases to almost double the average level 
before the crisis.  Second, in 2000, the composition of direct finance changes compared to 
before the crisis.  Equity takes away the share of the borrowing from financial markets 
(commercial paper, bonds, etc).    Lastly, foreign borrowing increases its share significantly. 
3. The Firm-level Data 
This study uses detailed financial information on the firms that have external audit reports.  
According to the Act on External Audit of Joint-Stock Corporations, a firm with assets of 7 billion 
                                                           
2  Although not shown in the table, the share of external finance in the total finance declined steadily throughout the 
1970’s and 1980’s until 1988.    For this period, except for the period of oil shocks, overseas export markets, 
together with emerging domestic markets, helped Korean firms to realize large profits.    The ratio of internal 
finance to total finance was less than 20 percent in 1975, but it continued to grow to a level of more than 40 percent 




won or more must issue audited financial statements.  The data thus include all the firms with 
assets of 7 billion won or more.    The total number of firms in the data is about 11,000. 
The Financial Supervisory Commission is responsible for establishing accounting and auditing 
standards and the Securities and Futures Commission is then responsible for the review of the 
audited financial statements issued by firms.  Finally, the National Information and Credit 
Evaluation, Inc. (NICE) coded this public information into their database after checking the 
consistency of the reported financial statements. 
From the NICE data, we can estimate only the borrowing from all the financial intermediaries, 
not the borrowings from the detailed components of indirect finance.  However, <table 1> in 
Section 2 shows that, after the crisis, most of the new lending by financial intermediaries is, in fact, 
from commercial banks, not from non-bank financial institutions.   
3.1 Summary Statistics 
<Table 2-1> presents sample means for the key variables in the empirical analysis It divides the 
sample period into the three sub-period around the crisis: 1992-1996 (before the crisis), 1997-1998 
(during the crisis), and 1999-2000 (after the crisis). Profitability is measured by the EBIT 
(Earnings Before Interest and Tax Payment) divided by total assets.  divided by total asset. After 
the crisis, the share of loans in asset increases compared with for the pre-crisis period; on the other 
hand, the weight of bond financing decreases. 
//Table 2-1 here// 
The financing pattern varies according to the size of firms. For example, the empirical 




this reason, we divide all individual firms into ten groups based on the distribution of asset size, 
and select three representative size cohorts for presenting the empirical results. The results are 
robust to minor changes in the thresholds. We employ the following three size cohorts: (1) the 
largest firms (top 1% in asset size)
3, (2) the medium-sized firms (middle 10% in asset size), and (3) 
the smallest firms (bottom 10% in asset size).   
For the three size cohorts, <table 2-2> provides sample means for the key variables in the 
empirical analysis It also divides the sample period into the three sub-period around the crisis. 
//Table 2-2 here// 
The statistics in <table 2-2> present a different picture compared to the one in <table 2-1>. The 
aggregate numbers in <table 2-1> do not fully capture the changes in the financing pattern 
experienced by heterogeneous firms during this period. Profitability evolves differently according 
to size groups. Profitability worsens for large and small firms whereas it rebounds for medium-
sized firms. While the share of loans in asset decreases for large firms, the opposite is the case for 
the other groups. After the crisis, large firms finance more in the bond market, but the other groups 
have more limited access to the bond market compared to the pre-crisis period. 
3.2 Firm Size Distribution 
<Figure 1-1> and <figure 1-2> show the yearly firm-size distributions for all the firms in the 
sample before and after the crisis.   Before the crisis, the distribution shifts to the right-hand side – 
implying an increase in firm size on average.  The shape of the distribution gets skewed to the 
right gradually over time until 1997.  We find relatively less small-sized firms over time in the 
                                                           
3  For the case of large firms, we present the results using this particular cohort, but defining the largest firms as 





//Figure 1-1 here// 
//Figure 1-2 here// 
After the crisis, it is hard to find a clear pattern in the shift of the distribution itself.  However, 
the left-hand tail of the distribution - the smallest firms in the sample – becomes thicker after the 
crisis.  The relative frequency of the smallest firms in the sample increases after the crisis.  This 
thicker right tail could come either from an increased number of new entrants or from the inclusion 
of extra-small firms (previously excluded from the sample) into the sample.    Note that we observe 
the opposite before the crisis - the left-hand tail of the distribution getting thinner. 
3.3 Firm Profitability Distribution 
<Figure 2-1> and <figure 2-2> present the yearly profitability distributions for all the firms in 
the sample before and after the crisis. The yearly distributions remain the same before the crisis.  
Then the crisis affects significantly the profitability distribution in 1997, indicating a decrease in 
firm profitability on average.  After the crisis, the profitability distribution shifts much to the right 
or left depending on the macroeconomic situations.  In fact, after the crisis, the magnitude of 
business cycle became larger than compared to the pre-crisis period.
4 
//Figure 2-1 here// 
//Figure 2-2 here// 
<Figure 2-3> shows that the small- and medium-sized firms have more dispersed distributions 
                                                           
4  The annual growth rates of GDP after the crisis are 5.0% (1997), –6.7% (1998), 10.9% (1999), and 8.8% (2000), 




in 1992-2000.  Since this pattern remains the same in the sample period, we do not present the 
yearly distributions here.  Large firms are more homogeneous in terms of profitability compared 
to the other size cohorts. 
//Figure 2-3 here// 
<Figure 2-4-1> and <figure 2-4-2> show that the crisis had an impact on the shape of the 
profitability for small firms.  After the crisis (1997-2000), the distribution gets more dispersed 
over time.  After the crisis small firms become a more heterogeneous group compared to the pre-
crisis period. 
//Figure 2-4-1 here// 
//Figure 2-4-2 here// 
4. Financing Pattern and the Crisis: Micro Evidence 
In Section 3.1, the summary statistics of key financing variables hint that the heterogeneity 
of firms is important in understanding the evolution of financing pattern after the crisis.  The 
sample means of key financing variables also hint the following pattern around the crisis: the 
largest firms are leaving financial intermediaries and switching directly to the financial markets for 
their financing, whereas the small- and medium-sized firms are increasing their dependency on 
financial intermediaries for financing.  In this section, we test these hypotheses rigorously.  To 
get genuine cross-sectional results, we must control for the effect of the business cycles. 
The empirical distributions of key financing variables have different shapes according to 




result of comparing the empirical distributions of key financing variables. 
4.1 Loans from Financial Institutions 
<Table 3> shows the regressions of the loan-borrowing ratio (defined as the borrowing from 
financial intermediaries divided by total borrowing) on the dummy variables denoting the size 
cohort interacted with year dummies and on the macro variables (growth rate of GDP, interest rate). 
The macro variables control for the effect of business cycles.    In <table 3>, therefore, the reported 
coefficient for the specific year indicates the loan-borrowing ratio’s difference between the size 
cohort in that specific year and all the other firms in the whole sample period.  <Table 3> shows 
the regression results for the three size cohorts (top 1%, middle 10%, bottom 10%). 
//Table 3 here// 
After the crisis (in 1998-2000), the largest firms decrease significantly the share of loans in 
total borrowing.  The coefficients for 1998-2000 are larger than 0.3 (all significant), whereas the 
coefficients for 1992-1997 are smaller than 0.2 (also all significant). That is, after the crisis, the 
largest firms are leaving financial intermediaries for their financing. 
For the small-sized firms this share jumps to a higher number from 1995 and stays more or less 
there even after the crisis.  The coefficients for 1992-4 are smaller than -0.2 (all significant), 
whereas the coefficients for 1996-2000 are larger than zero (in 1995, -.0.03); these coefficients are 
all significant except in 2000.  The small firms did not have much access to financial 
intermediaries in 1992-4, but they have better access to the loans from financial intermediaries 
afterwards. 




trend around the crisis.  Note that the summary statistics in Section 3.1 suggested a different 
interpretation as for the behavior of medium-sized firms. 
< Empirical Distribution of Loans for Different Cohorts> 
<Figure 3-1-1> and <figure 3-1-2> show the distribution of the loan-borrowing ratio for the 
largest cohort (top 1% firms in asset size) before and after the crisis.  After the crisis (in 1998-
2000), the loan-borrowing ratio distribution for the largest firms shifts leftwards clearly, as seen in 
<figure 3-1-2>.    This leftward shift starts partly in 1997 during the crisis. 
//Figure 3-1-1 here// 
//Figure 3-1-2 here// 
For the small-sized firms (bottom 10% firms in asset size) the distribution the loan-borrowing 
ratio shifts to the right markedly in 1996 (actually in 1995, although not shown in the paper) and 
maintains more or less this pattern even after the crisis (<figure 3-2-1> and <figure 3-2-2>). 
//Figure 3-2-1 here// 
//Figure 3-2-2 here// 
In <figure 3-2-1>, we note that, until 1994, a certain portion of the firms in our database does 
not have access to financial intermediaries for their corporate financing.  One could see a certain 
dense around zero.  However, after 1994, this pattern changes: the dense around zero continue to 
disappear until 1997, and, after the crisis, a dense around zero appears again, but to a much smaller 
scale than before 1995.  <Figure 3-2-1> and <figure 3-2-2> make another interesting point.  
After 1994, we continue to see a peak at one and a certain mass around one, which indicates that 
these firms depend (or do not depend) completely on the loans from financial intermediaries for 




For the medium-sized firms, the share of loans in total borrowing does not show any marked 
changes before and after the crisis, except that, after the crisis, we could see a more cluster around 
one (<figure 3-3-1> and <figure 3-3-2>). 
//Figure 3-3-1 here// 
//Figure 3-3-2 here// 
4.2 Determinants of the Changes in the Allocation of Loans 
Why do we observe such shifts in allocation of loans by financial institutions as documented in 
Section 4.1?    Are they reflecting the firms’ spontaneous choice for financing sources as a result of 
corporate restructuring?  Or, did the financial reform cause financial institutions to shift their 
lending patterns?  To see whether this is the case, we attempt to test the effect of individual firm 
profitability on the shift in allocation of loans by financial institutions. 
<Table 4> shows the regressions of the change in loans on firm profitability (interacted with 
year dummy) for small firms.    We also test the effect of the affiliation with chaebols on the access 
to loans.    The chaebol dummy distinguishes the top 30 chaebols from the others. 
//Table 4 here// 
<Table 4> suggests the interpretation that, for the small firms, profitability is an important 
factor in determining access to loans by financial institutions after the crisis.
5 Financial  institutions 
actively search for profitable small firms to provide loans after the crisis.  In Section 3.4, we 
pointed out that that the crisis had an impact on the shape of the profitability for small firms.   The 
profitability distribution becomes more dispersed after the crisis.  It means that selecting efficient 
                                                           




small firms became more difficult after the crisis. 
Before the crisis, profitability was not a factor in the access of small firms to loans; on the 
contrary, inefficient small firms did have more access to loans by financial institutions.  This 
reflects the fact that small firms were much protected through various regulations by the 
government before the crisis.  Note that the affiliation with chaebols has a negative effect on the 
access to loans.  In Korea, small firms affiliated with chaebols usually do not get the protection 
but rather face tight regulations to the effect of protecting other independent small firms.  This 
kind of regulations is gradually shrinking after the crisis. 
4.3 Total Borrowing 
      In Section 4.1, it is suggested that the largest firms are leaving financial intermediaries for their 
corporate financing after the crisis.  Then, the question arises: do the large firms decrease 
investment and scale down their business?  Otherwise, do they find other sources of financing 
after the crisis?    To check this, we look at total borrowing before and after the crisis. 
<Table 5> shows the regressions of the borrowing-dependency ratio (defined as total borrowing 
divided by total assets) on the dummy variables denoting the size cohort interacted with year 
dummies and on the macro variables (growth rate of GDP, interest rate).  In <table 7>, the 
reported coefficient for the specific year indicates the borrowing-dependency differences between 
the size cohort in that specific year and all the other firms in the whole sample period.  <Table 5> 
shows the regression results for the three size cohorts (top 1%, middle 10%, bottom 10%). 
//Table 5 here// 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




The crisis affected the borrowing-dependency ratio of all the cohorts only during the crisis.  
When the crisis dies out, the borrowing-asset ratio returns to the previous trend.  The share of 
borrowing in total assets went up much more for the small-sized firms during the crisis than the 
other size cohorts.    Unlike the others, small firms didn’t have other cushions (e.g., equity, retained 
earnings) to absorb the adverse effect of the crisis. 
4.4 Financing in the Bond Market 
The above result implies that the large firms moves to some other sources of financing after the 
crisis.  This section will show that the large firms go to the bond market to compensate the 
decrease in loans by financial institutions.  This was hinted in Section 2.1.  We test it formally in 
the following. 
<Table 6> shows the regressions of the bond-borrowing ratio (defined as the borrowing from 
financial markets divided by total borrowing) on the dummy variables denoting the size cohort 
interacted with year dummies and on the macro variables (growth rate of GDP, interest rate).  In 
<table 6>, the reported coefficient for the specific year indicates the bond-borrowing ratio’s 
differences between the size cohort in that specific year and all the other firms in the whole sample 
period.  <Table 6> shows the regression results for the three size cohorts (top 1%, top 6% - top 
10%, top 11% - top 20%).   The reason for choosing a different set of cohorts for <table 4> is that, 
for the sample period, the small- and medium-sized firms (the cohorts we used in the regression 
analysis before) don’t have any access to the borrowing from financial markets. 
//Table 6 here// 




in total borrowing.  The coefficients for 1998-2000 are around 0.4 (all significant), whereas the 
coefficients for 1992-1997 are smaller than 0.3 (also all significant). 
For all the size cohorts, the share of bond financing in total asset increases gradually from 1992 
to 1996.    This is due to the financial liberalization policy gradually taken by the government since 
the early 1990s.  During this period the size of bond market in Korea gradually expanded.  The 
bond market gets developed more rapidly with the speed-up of financial liberalization policy after 
the crisis. 
< Empirical Distribution of Bond Financing for Different Cohorts > 
<Figure 4-1-1> and <Figure 4-1-2> show the bond-borrowing ratio distributions before and 
after the crisis for the largest cohort.  After the crisis (in 1998-2000), the bond-borrowing ratio 
distribution for the largest firms shifts clearly to the right (<figure 4-1-2>). 
//Figure 4-1-1 here// 
//Figure 4-1-2 here// 
In <figure 4-2-1> and <figure 4-2-2>, we show the similar figures for another size cohort (top 
11% - top 20% firms in asset size).    This cohort is, in fact, the smallest firms to have any access to 
the bond market at all in the sample period.  For this cohort, the loan-borrowing ratio distribution 
shifts to the right marginally before the crisis.  After the crisis, however, the distribution shifts 
back to the left.  There is a large peak around zero in 1999.and the distribution becomes 
degenerate in 2000 (i.e., this cohort does not have any access to bond market).   A large proportion 
of the bonds that has been issued during the crisis, were under the risk of default, especially after 
the demise of the Daewoo group (one of the top four chaebols at that time in Korea) in 1999.  





//Figure 4-2-1 here// 
//Figure 4-2-2 here// 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The paper documents that large firms, to some extent, are leaving banks and going to the 
capital market for their financing after the crisis.
 6  The paper also shows that profitable small 
firms are gaining easier access to credit by financial institutions after the crisis.  Financial 
institutions are reallocating their credit from large firms to small firms after the crisis.    Why do we 
observe such shifts in the allocation of loans by financial institutions?  Are they reflecting the 
firms’ spontaneous choice for financing sources as a result of corporate restructuring?  Otherwise, 
did the financial reform cause financial institutions to change their lending practices?  The paper 
suggests that the banks’ improved lending practices, at least partially, contributed to this shift. 
                                                           
6  Clearly, the liberalization of financial markets, which happened at an accelerating rate after the crisis, contributed 
to broaden the supply base of various corporate financing sources.    But, in Korea, deepening furthermore the 
supply base of various corporate financing sources still requires a better protection of investors’ legitimate rights for 
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<Figure 1-1> Before the Crisis; 1992 - 1997
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<Figure 1-2> After the Crisis; 1997 - 2000
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<Figure 2-1>  Before the Crisis; 1992 - 1997
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<Figure 2-2> After the Crisis; 1997 - 2000
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<Figure 2-3> Sample Period; 1992 - 2000
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<Figure 2-4-1> Small-sized Firms - Bottom 10%; Before the Crisis
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<Figure 2-4-2> Small-sized Firms - Bottom 10%; After the Crisis
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<Figure 3-1-1> Largest Firms - Top 1 %; Before the Crisis 
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<Figure 3-1-2> Largest Firms - Top 1 %; After the Crisis 
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<Figure 3-2-1> Small-sized Firms - Bottom 10%; Before the Crisis 
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<Figure 3-2-2> Small-sized Firms - Bottom 10%; After the Crisis 
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<Figure 3-3-1> Medium-sized Firms - Middle 10%; Before the Crisis 
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<Figure 3-3-2> Medium-sized Firms - Middle 10%; After the Crisis 
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<Figure 4-1-1> Large-sized Firms - Top 1 %; Before the Crisis 
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<Figure 4-1-2> Large-sized Firms - Top 1 %; After the Crisis 
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10 Table 1.  Sources of Corporate Financing (Flows) 
For All the Firms in the Korean Economy 
1992 - 2000 
(Unit; %) 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
 Total Finance  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  _ 
   Retained Earnings   28.7   30.0   27.3   27.9   22.6   27.1   50.0   49.4  _ 
   External Finance   71.3   70.0   72.7   72.1   77.4   72.9   50.0   50.6  _ 
 External Finance  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 Indirect Finance   36.3   31.4   44.5   31.8   28.0   36.8    -57.3   4.1   17.1 
    Commercial Banks   15.1   13.1   20.7   14.9   14.0   12.9    2.5   29.2   35.2 
    Insurance Companies   3.9   3.1   2.4   2.7   2.8   2.3  -20.8   0.5   3.1 
    Short-term Finance   
    Companies  
   (e.g., Merchant Banks) 
-0.4   2.4   4.3   0.5  -0.4   1.8  -22.4  -2.6  -6.8 
    Other Non-bank   
    Financial ntermediaries  17.7  12.8  17.1  13.7  11.5  19.8  -16.7  -22.9  -14.4 
 Direct Finance   38.9   49.1   36.5   48.1   47.2   37.4  178.9   46.8   28.6 
    Government Bonds    3.3    3.4    0.4    -0.9    0.3    0.5    2.0    0.0    -2.2 
    Commercial Paper    7.6   13.9    4.9   16.1   17.5    3.7    -42.2    -30.4    -1.7 
    Corporate Bonds   12.1   14.5   14.2   15.3   17.9   23.3  165.9    -5.3    -3.2 
    Equity   15.9   17.3   17.0   17.6   11.6    9.9   53.2   82.6   35.6 
 Foreign Borrowing    7.1    1.5    6.6    8.4   1 0.4    5.6    -35.5   24.1   23.7 
 Borrowing from   
 Government    1.0    -0.2    0.2    0.2    -0.2    1.4    5.8    3.6    7.4 
 Inter-firm Credit    8.9    9.0    6.9    5.0    6.8   10.6  -27.2   10.2    6.8 
 Etc     7.9    9.2    5.3    6.5    7.8    8.4   35.3   11.1   16.5 
Source:  Author’s own calculation from the information in each issue of the Flow of Funds. Table 2-1. Summary Statistics of Firm-level Data 
(simple mean, in percent) 
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Table 2-2. Summary Statistics for the Three size Cohorts in Firm-level Data 
(simple mean, percent; asset in billion won) 
 
Large Firms 




(Middle 10% in asset size, n=1039) 
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Table 3.  Test of Loan-Dependency for Size Cohorts 
 
Dependent variable 













Middle 10% in 
Asset Size 
Small-sized Firms 
Bottom 10% in Asset 














































































56,990  56,990  56,990 
Note:    1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2.  *  significant at the 10% significance level. 
         **  significant at the 5% significance level. 
      3.  Bond-dependency  ratio refers to  the borrowing from financial markets divided by total 










Table 4.  Determinant of Loans for the Small-sized Firms 




Dependent Variable: Change in Loans 








Profitability * 1995 Dummy  -2.209054
** 
(-2.03) 
Profitability * 1996 Dummy 
-2.243971** 
(-2.00) 




Profitability * 1998 Dummy  -1.682216
** 
(-2.41) 
Profitability * 1999 Dummy 
1.092807** 
(2.76) 


















Yield to Corporate Bonds  2.478495 
(0.93) 
Number of observations  4,388 
Note:    1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2.  *  significant at the 10% significance level. 
         **  significant at the 5% significance level. 
      3. Profitability refers to the EBIT divided by total assets. 
 
 
 Table 5.  Test of Borrowing-Dependency for Size Cohorts 
 
Dependent variable 













Middle 10% in 
Asset Size 
Small-sized Firms 
Bottom 10% in Asset 















































































61,732  61,732  61,732 
Note:    1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2.  *  significant at the 10% significance level. 
         **  significant at the 5% significance level. 
      3. Borrowing-dependency ratio refers to the total borrowing divided by total assets. Table 6.  Test of Bond-Dependency for Size Cohorts 
 
Dependent variable 









Top 1% in Asset 
Size 
Top 6% - Top 10% 
in Asset Size 
Top 11% - Top 20% 















































































56,990  56,990  56,990 
Note:    1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2.  *  significant at the 10% sig nificance level. 
         **  significant at the 5% significance level. 
      3.  Bond-dependency  ratio refers to  the borrowing from financial markets divided by total 
borrowing. 
 